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Abstract : It is pointed out that the probabilistic character of a theory does not 
indicate by itself a distancing with respect to the norms of objectification. Instead, 
the very structure of the calculation of probabilities utilised by this theory is 
capable of bearing the trace of a constitution of objectivity in Kant’s sense. 
Accordingly, the procedure of the constitution of objectivity is first studied in 
standard and in quantum cases with due reference to modern cognitive science. 
Then, an examination of the differences between classical and quantum 
probabilities is performed. It is shown that the form of the quantum calculation of 
the probabilities carries the mark of the contextuality of the phenomena on which it 
bears. Conversely, certain conditions that have the form of Bell’s inequalities carry 
the mark of decontextualization.  
 
A literal reading of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience has often 
allowed it to be supposed that the constitution of objectivity is conditioned 
by a strict determinist application of the category of causality to phenomena 
manifest in space-time. This conclusion is however not self-evident, 
whether in its Kantian dimension or its scientific one. On the one hand, 
closer readings of Kant (Brittan 1994) have led to a loosening of the linkage 
apparently established by him between the constitution of objectivity and 
‘exact causal determinism’ (Kojève 1990). On the other, divergence 
between objectification and the applicability to phenomena of a rule of 
determinist succession has been strongly suggested by reflections 
associated with the developments and reinterpretations of quantum 
mechanics. One need only think of the classification of ‘ontologically 
interpretable’ hidden variable theories into causal theories and stochastic 
theories (Bohm and Hiley 1993) to actualise the conclusion that the 
possibility of constituting a region of objectivity (and accessorily to 
hypostatise it ontologically) is independent of the direct application of 
determinism to spatio-temporal phenomena. After all, Brownian motion 
described in an exclusively stochastic mode is not any less objective than 
Brownian motion linked back to underlying micro-level movements 
governed by determinist laws. If there is a genuine line of demarcation for 
objectivity, this is not to be established between phenomena anticipated in 
determinist manner and phenomena antici- pated in a purely probabilistic 
mode, but somewhere in the middle of this latter category of phe- nomena. 
Certain physical theories offering irreducibly probabilistic predictions are 
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compatible with the hypothesis of a constituted objectivity of the spatio-
temporal events on which they bear, while others are not (Pitowsky 1994). 
To which may be added the fact that all the known physical theories, among 
those that offer probabilistic predictions, are based on a law of continuous 
and deterministic evolution of probabilities, or of functions which allow 
probabilities to be calculated. Among the laws of this type may be cited the 
‘master equations’ and the BBGKY equations of classical statistical 
mechanics, or else Schrödinger’s equation for quantum mechanics. Physical 
theories of stochastic type thus set in train an unexpected displacement, 
towards a representation space for the probabilities, of the locus of 
application of the causality principle, rather than a pure and simple setting 
aside of the latter. 
 
Definitively speaking, far from the probabilistic character of a theory 
indicating by its very nature a distancing with respect to the norms of 
objectification, the very structure of the calculation of probabilities utilised 
by this theory is capable of bearing the trace of a constitution of objectivity. 
Whether it be of a prior constitution of objectivity in space-time, or of 
elements of a formal constitution of objectivity in an abstract 
representational space of the instruments of the calculation of the 
probabilities, or indeed of both at the same time. 
The role and extent of involvement of the category of causality among 
the a priori possibility conditions of an objective element of knowledge 
must therefore be thoroughly redefined, by con- stantly referring to the case 
of quantum physics. The aim of such a re-examination is obviously not to 
fall into the extreme of a complete rejection of Kant’s philosophy in the 
name of advances in the field of physics, after having criticised the opposite 
extreme which consists of constraining physics to conform to a rigid (and 
caricatural) variety of the Kantian epistemological mould. The aim is rather 
to contribute to a re-ordering, an extension and a systematic mobilisation of 
the trans- cendental method, whose principle remains a precious guiding 
thread for any reflection about physics. 
In the spirit of such a re-examination as has just been described, the plan 
of this article will begin by conforming to the altered hierarchy of the 
Analogies of Experience as proposed by P.F. Strawson (1966: 140–146). 
According to Strawson, a good number of the difficulties met by Kant in his 
process of distinguishing between a subjective succession of perceptions 
and a succes- sion of states attributable to a perceived object in itself can be 
resolved on the condition of partly inverting the conventional order of 
application of the categories of substance, causality and reciprocity. 
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Following this modified order, the first operation necessary for 
distinguishing between a subjective series and an objective series derives 
from the central notion of the Third Analogy of Experience which is only 
evoked in passing at the beginning of the exposition of the proof of the First 
Analogy. This operation consists of a setting in simultaneity arising out of a 
sequential empirical datum. It amounts to proceeding backwards from the 
succession and multiplicity of perceptions to the coexistence and unity of 
one or several sets of determinations. It is hence a relation between these 
fixed and coexisting determinations and a moving subject that retrospec- 
tively explains the changing character of perceptions. 
The second operation, proper to the Second Analogy, has to provide 
criteria allowing us to consider ‘a change in our perceptions as the 
perception of a change’ (Strawson 1966: 143). It presupposes the first 
operation, which consisted of extracting a stable kernel of coexistence from 
the sequence of perceptions; for the perception of a change could not 
emerge except as a non-eliminable residue of an attempt to fix an invariant 
of perceptions. 
Finally, the third operation, in line with the First Analogy, is a moment 
of re-identification. It allows us to pass from the simple perception of a 
change to the perception of the change which affects a ‘substance’ which is 
otherwise unchanged. The success of this operation guarantees that, within 
a reasonable interval of time, the perceived change will not go beyond all 
possibility of the object being recognised. Presented in this way, the 
condition of substantiality appears less crucial than its situation at the 
culmination of the system of the Analogies of Experience would have one 
think. No doubt the extraction of local islands of relative permanence in the 
nexus of perceived change is necessary, as Kant writes, to identify relations 
in time against their back- ground. But nothing imperatively requires that 
these points of identification should be present everywhere (and on every 
scale) nor that their duration should extend beyond what is required by their 
function as terms of comparison. 
Following sections 1 and 2, devoted to the first two of these constitutive 
moments of objectivity and the discussion of their relevance when applied 
to quantum theories, section 3 will address the question of the probabilistic 
feature of an objectivity constituted in space-time. We will observe that the 
quantum calculation of probabilities limits itself generally to operating a 
formal constitution of objectivity within an abstract space (a Hilbert or 
Fock space), without carrying this feature of preconstitution of objectivity 
in space-time. Only the processes of decoherence succeed in causing such a 
feature to re-emerge. We will reach a conclusion in section 4 on the 
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transcendental status of decoherence. 
1. Objectivity as detachment/stabilisation 
The characteristic of the object, in its purely etymological sense, is to be 
‘set before’, to be disas- sociated from the background of the subjective, 
perceptive and instrumental circumstances of its manifestation. The object 
is identified with what has been able to be so thoroughly disassociated from 
the particular moments of its appearing that each of these moments 
becomes inversely inter- pretable as one of its appearances. 
To take up a famous example proposed by Kant (1964: 220), ‘[...] the 
apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands 
before me is successive’ (A190/B235). The order of this apprehension 
depends on the method of investigation chosen by the subject. But the 
designation of the house, and the system of human actions conducted in its 
regard presupposes that there is something constant which holds 
simultaneously available for investigation an infinite number of aspects 
(Husserl’s ‘sketches’). The separation of a perfectly stable unit endowed 
with coexistent determinations with respect to the sometimes concomitant 
sometimes chronologically sequential multiplicity of particular 
manifestations is, in other words, the primordial condition for a constitution 
of objectivity. It is only via reference to this initially prescribed stability 
that can subsequently be raised the question of rule-governed downstream 
effects and changes authenticated by physical laws. 
Most contemporary research in the cognitive sciences moreover holds as 
an essential (if not to say exclusive) requisite for the constitution of 
objectivity a sufficient co-ordination of sensorial apprehensions so as to 
detach a coexistent unity through ‘triangulation’. This co-ordination, 
effected through a movement-engendering mediation, is considered to 
function on two levels: (1) the level of each sensorial modality, which is 
successive, and (2) the level of sensorial intermodality, which is 
immediately simultaneous. 
For a given sensorial modality, the co-ordination between successive 
apprehensions depends on a rule of motor activity that allows their 
reproducibility to be attested, with the proviso of ceteris paribus. This 
motor activity rule, as demonstrated by Jean Piaget following the 
reflections of Henri Poincaré, takes the form of a Group of transformations 
(with the transformations being limited to a single individual or extended 
by delegation to a social community). Among the defining moments of a 
Group, the one which most clearly applies in the constitution of objectivity 
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is the assignation of an inverse for each element structured by the law of 
composition. The reiteration of a certain sensible configuration of a set of 
translations and rotations under the condition of invertibility disconnects it 
in effect from the particular conditions realised at the moment of its first 
manifestation and thereby renders it objective. More generally, as B.C. 
Smith (1998, ch.7) explains, the constitution of a world of objects requires 
active and systematic compensation for the variations in perceptible 
actuality, and the correlative emergence of stable poles lending them- 
selves to intentional direction of perception. The process of objectification 
comes down in other words to ‘deconvolving the deixis’ (ibid. 235), to 
undoing the tangled skein of a here-and-now of overpowering obviousness. 
The object is the ‘triangulated’ focus of this deconvolution through a 
maximal compensation (motor or instrumental) of the factors of variation, 
and the subject reci- procally is ‘the long-term integral or aggregate of that 
which it must compensate for in order to stabilize the rest of the world’ 
(ibid. 240). 
The case of sensorial intermodality has more particularly been studied by 
J. Proust (1997) in the context of a methodological phenomenalism inspired 
by the earlier work of Rudolf Carnap. Proust starts out afresh from the 
remark according to which objectification is above all the process of 
dissociating something with respect to the immediacy apprehended by the 
senses. But according to this position, the crucial moment of this 
disassociation occurs as soon as several sensorial modalities converge in 
one and the same spatial area. It is this ‘synergy’ of the manifold modal 
items of information that allows the extraction to be initiated of local 
invariants vis-à-vis the changing of sensorial channels. One thinks here of a 
famous remark of Aristotle, adopted and applied anew by Galileo and 
Locke, with respect to the assistance brought by the multiplicity of the 
senses to make plain the ‘common sensibles’ that are spatial magnitude and 
movement (Aristotle, On the Soul II-6 and III-1). But of course, the 
plurality of sensorial pathways does not suffice in itself to guarantee the 
fixation of objective focal sectors separate from the modes of their 
appearance. There needs to be added a motor and perceptive capability to 
calibrate the sen- sible entries; that is, a capability for constantly correcting 
these entries to make them conform to the rules of association which define 
the coexistent unity of the determinations within an object. The principal of 
these rules is called by Proust (1997: 290–291) the ‘constraint of 
equilocality’. It amounts to the imposition of a condition of coherence (or 
of non-contradiction) on to the attribution of multiple qualities sharing one 
and the same spatial localisation, and in return, to the defining of spatial 
localisation as what the manifold qualities associated by the condition of 
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coherence have in common. 
Classical physics (to say nothing of classical science in its entirety) is 
based on the implicit postulate, embedded in the structures of theory and in 
the presuppositions of experimentation, that these two moments of 
objectifying detachment have always already been accomplished. On the 
level of theory, it non-problematically describes bundles of properties 
linked by constraints of equilocality. The state of the mechanism thus 
consists of a list of six co-ordinates (three spatial co-ordinates and three 
components of the quantity of motion) attributed to one and the same 
material point at a given instant. Another example is that of the three 
quantities (pressure, volume and temperature) assigned simultaneously to a 
gas sample enclosed in one and the same cavity; quantities which are 
constrained not only by a condition of non-contradiction (just as are those 
com- posing the mechanical state), but also by a condition of 
thermodynamic consistency which takes the form of the Boyle-Mariotte 
law. 
On the level of its relation to experimentation, classical physics 
moreover presupposes a large number of (at least asymptotic) indifference 
clauses: indifference of each quantity with respect to the model of 
experimental set-up used to evaluate it; application of the principle of 
indifference to results with respect to the order in which the measurements 
of several quantities are successively carried out; indifference of 
determinations with respect to the multiplication of simultaneous 
experiments bearing upon several quantities. The first indifference clause 
allows the detachment of each quantity measured from the configuration of 
its particular measurement method, such that henceforth it is related to only 
one equivalence class of measurement methods. This equivalence class can 
moreover be reciprocally understood as the operative definition of the 
quantity concerned. The second indifference clause guarantees both the 
possibility of detaching each determination of the contingent circumstances 
from the experimental act associated with its manifestation as well as the 
possibility of distinguishing a federative unity vis-à-vis the operative 
history of the modes of manifestation of the federated determinations. It is 
maintained right up to and including the cases where the measurements of 
values are in practice sensitive to the order in which those measurements 
are made, via a double safeguard clause according to which: (1) the 
sensitivity to order is explained by the presence of a disturbance agent 
which, for its part, transitively satisfies all the indifference conditions, and 
(2) the disturbance is capable of indefinite diminution. Finally, the third 
indifference clause completes the detachment of a unity bearing 
simultaneous determinations under the hypothesis of an asymptotically non-
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disturbant character of the mode of measurement. 
The preceding remarks could be summed up by saying that the paradigm 
of classical physics automatically sets in operation, at the heart of its 
formalism and the presuppositions of its attestation, the conditions for a 
disassociation of localised objects, simultaneously taking the sum of their 
available determinations as an experimental ‘evidential proof’. 
In quantum theory matters are quite different. The formula of 
coexistence of the variables of position and quantity of motion within a 
particular state is here replaced by a commutator relationship which 
signifies the partial incompatibility (to an approximation approaching the 
order of Planck’s constant) of the two conjugated variables, or which 
indirectly formulates (through the Heisenberg relations which are deduced 
from it) a limit to the precision with which the value of each of these two 
variables can be fixed. These relationships of commuta- tion are not just 
one characteristic among others of quantum theory; they are the central 
consti- tuent element of it. The universal process that permits the 
formulation of a quantum theory in effect consists of replacing the variables 
of a prior classical theory by operators bound together through a 
commutator relation. It therefore seems that what defines quantum theories 
is the exact opposite of what defines classical theories, namely the 
exclusion of the coexistence of certain pairs of variables. 
On the level of the relation to experimentation, the only indifference 
clause retained in compar- ison with the case of classical physics is the 
indifference of each quantity to the experimental model used to evaluate it. 
This is the sense of Bohr’s correspondence principle and of frequent 
remarks of Schrödinger (1995) regarding the classical heritage in the 
definition of variables in quantum mechanics. On the other hand, the 
multiplication of simultaneous experiments is limited (or at least there is an 
implied limitation in the precision of measurement results); and furthermore, 
indifference to the order of measurement is not generally guaranteed, be it 
only in principle. 
Let’s develop this latter point a little further, by considering a canonical 
experimental situa- tion. Three measurements are successively effected 
upon the ‘same object’1 (let’s say a particle of spin 1/2), following the 
sequence Sx then Sz, then once more Sx. The observables Sx and Sz 
correspond to the measurements of the component of spin according to the 
Ox and Oz axes respectively. Each of the two observables possesses two 
eigenvalues particular to each (+1/2 and –1/2), and two eigenvectors (or 
eigenstates) denoted respectively as: 
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⎜+x〉, ⎜-x〉, and ⎜+z〉, ⎜-z〉.  
 
Let’s now look at an example of what happens with the series of 
measurements (Sx-Sz-Sx). The first Sx measurement provides a certain 
result (say + 1/2). The measurement of Sz, coming second in the sequence, 
supplies another result (say + 1/2 again, but the reasoning would not be 
affected if it were -1/2). The last Sx measurement, carried out just after that 
of Sz in the sequence (Sx-Sz-Sx) can then, according to quantum predictions, 
lead just as readily to the result + 1/2 as to the result -1/2, with a probability 
of 1⁄2 for each of these. But if the series was (Sx-Sx-Sz), the result of the 
second measurement of Sx would have been definitively +1/2. In quantum 
mechanics, the indifference condition for the order of measurement is thus 
generally not satisfied. Of course, since Heisenberg and Bohr, physicists 
have not failed to try and apply the usual safeguard clause that consists of 
explaining the sensitivity to measurement order by a disturbance (here 
incompressible and uncontrollable) due to the intervening agency of 
measurement. But numerous objections can be levelled against the 
importation of this concept of disturbance from the classical conceptual 
field to the quantum domain. The first such objection, historical in nature, is 
that after 1935 Bohr himself no longer believed in it, in consideration of the 
problems he raised in the interpretation of the thought experiment of 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) (Bohr 1961: 59). The second, more 
formal in nature, is that quantum theory incorporates sensitivity to the order 
of determinations as a constituent element (here again through commutation 
relation- ships) rather than as a secondary circumstance capable of being 
explained from more fundamental principles. The traditional ‘explanation’ 
by way of a disturbance would be found to be totally coherent only within a 
framework totally different from that of quantum mechanics, such as that of 
the theory of non-local hidden variables formulated by Bohm in 1952; only 
this type of theory is able to make operative (supposedly) more 
fundamental principles in relation to which the dependence of micro-level 
phenomena upon the sequential order of the experiments appears as a 
simple derived consequence. 
This process of the carrying over of indifference clauses on to an agency 
of disturbance will be re-addressed in the next section. But it should 
henceforth be kept in mind that once this aspect is given up, a decisive 
moment of the procedure of objectification through ‘setting in simultaneity’ 
or, if one wishes, through stabilisation of properties from the flux of 
phenomena, is no longer available. The recognised mode of expression, 
since von Neumann, according to which an object possesses the ‘property’ 
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⎜+x〉〈+x⎜ when the measured value of Sx is + 1/2, appears in these 
conditions to be very unadapted. It has only been formally preserved via the 
concept of ‘consistent histories’ of Robert Griffiths (Omnès 1999: 177ff.) 
on the condition of admitting that, between two measurements, there is not 
a single actual series but a multiplicity of virtual series of properties. 
Another, less artificial, manner of preserving in quantum physics the 
foundation moment of objectivity that is the formal concept of a property 
was proposed by Peter Mittelstaedt (1994). It consists in retaining only 
‘unsharp’ properties, obeying Heisenberg relations not in their statistical 
distribution but directly in their individual definition (they are said to be e-
defined). With ‘unsharp’ properties automatically respecting the sequential 
indifference clause, nothing stands in the way of simultaneously attributing 
to a microscopic object couples of properties of this type corresponding to 
couples of conjugated variables. The problem that I perceive in 
Mittelstaedt’s strategy is that his procedure of co-ordination and ‘setting in 
simultaneity’ is only valid for a restrictive class of phenomena obtained by 
means of those instruments of measurement that are such as can provide a 
e-distribution at the moment of each individual evaluation. That means that, 
contrary to Kant’s approach which aimed at universality, this strategy of 
objectivity-detachment constitution in the validity domain of quantum 
theory remains narrowly regional, if not lacunary. 
2. Action and rules 
The completion of the process of ‘setting in simultaneity’ is susceptible 
to leaving behind it an irreducible residue of change. An element of change 
which, despite efforts directed towards this, has not been able to be brought 
in under a controlled variation of the established relationship between a 
stable object property and a cognitive apparatus. The issue is now to 
comprehend how one can make the distinction between what, in this 
residual element of change, may be due to an at once contingent and 
uncontrollable variation in the object/cognitive apparatus relationship, and 
what may be attributed in proper to objects. Answering this question 
supposes that interest will be taken in certain additional 
detachment/stabilisation processes, analogous in their principle to those 
which have led to the location of coexistent determinations in an object, but 
applying selec- tively to the residual element of change that they have left 
behind. These new processes tend to isolate an element of sequential 
reproducibility in the residual change. And the consistent form of the 
sequence is assimilated to a law, as per the elegant definition of it given by 
Moritz Schlick (1979: 8): ‘the permanent in an alteration is called its law’. 
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The nature of the change that it is a matter of objectifying, which is 
‘residual’ with respect to an initial active process of objectification, 
immediately discards the strictly empiricist, passive or receptive theories of 
causality. Since the change to be encompassed by a law arises from a 
system of acts of ‘calibration’ or correction which has beforehand allowed 
the definition of properties, only its inscription in an additional nexus of 
actions can allow a discriminatory analysis to emerge capable of 
determining the extent, in itself, of the accidental and the necessary, the 
uncontrollably relational and the objective. The role played by manipulative 
and/or experimental activity in the setting in place of causal relationships 
has indeed been long recognised. By Kant first of all, who, after restricting 
the application of the principle of causal linkage to succession, extended it 
to determinability in time of the relation between a simultaneous antecedent 
cause and a consequent effect, by means of an action of manipulation of the 
antecedent (Kant 1964: 228 [A203–B248]). By Jean Piaget (1970) and 
Georg Henrik von Wright (1974) in their turn, who designate action as a 
primitive concept in their exposition of the constitutive procedures of 
causality. 
However, conceptions of causality based on the concept of action have 
been taxed with charges of anthropocentrism and circularity of argument, 
and given this, it is better to reply to these in anticipation. 
The charge of anthropocentrism, to take that first, comes from the 
confusion of the active identification of the reproducible factors of a 
sequence of events with a simple projection of the role of the agent as the 
archetypal determining factor. Yet, between the detachment/stabilisation 
activity of causal factors and the activity consisting of self-intervention as a 
causal factor, there is an obvious difference of both genetic and 
epistemological type. On the genetic level, it is possible, as demonstrated 
by Piaget (1970: 260ff.) to distinguish a stage in the development of 
children during which the only type of cause they recognise is their own 
actions, and a later stage after which causal power is passed over to objects. 
On the epistemological level, it is clear that experimental action does not 
aim at serving as a substitute for the causal association, but to the contrary 
at conferring autonomy on it by drawing out through systematic variation of 
antecedents that which, within the causal association, does not depend on 
an accidental situation or on an con- tingent relationship with the cognitive 
apparatus of the subject. 
The charge of circularity, in second place, depends upon an almost trivial 
observation. This observation is that the proof of a reiteration of the same 
events on condition of the active reprodu- cibility of the antecedent cause, 
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which is one of the key moments of the performative constitution of 
causality, presupposes that a given manipulation effected by the agent on 
the antecedent will each time have the same effect. Now such a 
presupposition seems to come down to posing in advance that the world is 
endowed with an elementary causal order: that which guarantees the 
identity of the immediate effects of similar actions. Thus the derivation of 
causal rules by experi- mentation appears to depend in circular fashion on 
the postulate of a causal rule applying to the relationship between the 
experimental acts and their outcome. To this charge, von Wright (1974: § 
II-2) replied by pointing out the difference between a presupposed order 
and an objectified order. It is true that experimental action rests upon a tacit 
confidence in the regularity of its effects, but it does not demand that the 
confidence by which it is pre-conditioned be thematised in causal or law-
related assertions. It rests upon an always-and-already available know-how 
that it has served to derive. If circle there is, in this case it is simply a non-
vicious circle of self-consistency between the pre-supposition around the 
determination of the results of an experimental action and the determinist 
law-related association by which classical mechanics describes the 
phenomena manifesting themselves in the space and on the scale of human 
activity. 
With these objections now addressed, we can go on further to develop 
the idea of a performa- tive constitution of causal relationships. First of all, 
what linkage can properly associate the pro- cess of identification of rules 
of consequentiality with that prior-appertaining rule of the 
detachment/stabilisation of properties? This linkage, suggested in the 
previous section in the con- text of the comparison between classical and 
quantum physics, is established to all appearances through the notion of 
disturbance. When a maximised set of calibration/correction activities has 
failed to render a certain local phenomenon perfectly invariant, when this 
phenomenon undergoes change despite the return to the initial cognitive 
situation through assemblage of positional trans- formations conferred with 
a group structure, two options are available. Either to give up without 
further ado the attempt to attribute the phenomenon to a stable property, 
which signifies the fail- ure, at least in part, of the procedure of detachment. 
Or to transitively displace the locus of appli- cation of the conditions of 
detachment/stabilisation towards another property that is capable of 
explaining the variation of the phenomenon. This displacement allows two 
important results to be obtained. On the one hand, the process of 
objectification by detachment/stabilisation, momenta- rily halted by the 
observation of imperfect invariance of the distal pole of the investigation, is 
re- activated by being carried over on to the constitution of disturbance 
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properties. On the other hand, once related to the interference of the 
disturbance property, the variation of the initial phe- nomenon can be 
considered as the feature of a disturbed property. That allows for a 
retroactive extension of the effect of the objectification procedure on to the 
very phenomenon which initially was presenting an obstacle to its 
application, namely the change in this phenomenon. 
Of course, the method of transitive application of the procedure of 
detachment/stabilisation to dis-turbance properties does not come without 
difficulties and limitations. In particular it could happen that the 
phenomenon whose stabilisation in a disturbance property it was wanted to 
ensure itself shows irreducible variations. In the face of this challenge, the 
two most commonly taken ways out consist either of engaging upon an 
indefinite regression of the disturbed properties and the disturbing 
properties, or (in certain cases) of considering the possibility of reciprocal 
disturbances. A third solu- tion appeals to the concept of event. The event 
may be considered as a temporal property slice (we will label it in this case 
a P-event) or as a property modification (that sort of event we will label an 
M-event). The advantage of the event is that it is detachable/stabilisable by 
nature, even when the potential properties that it manifests are, as per 
hypothesis, unstable. The event can effectively be attested by a set of other 
properties of objects irreversibly modified as a consequence of its occur- 
rence, which are referred to as its traces. Instead of relating the alteration of 
a phenomenon to a dis- turbance property, the new strategy of 
objectification of change thereby consists of linking an M-event, 
detached/stabilised by its traces, to a prior event, equally 
detached/stabilised by its traces. The prior event can be a temporal property 
slice (a P-event), and thus one arrives at the exact equiv- alent, reformulated, 
of the sequence disturbance property/altered phenomenon. But it can 
equally be an M-event, which avoids having to depend on the stability of 
disturbance properties, or on resorting systematically to an infinite 
regression aiming at designating an initial truly stable disturbance prop- 
erty. From the still concrete representation of the disturbance, one may then 
pass to the form of a law governing the succession of events. 
We have earlier seen how the programme of investigation consisting of 
going back to the ante- cedent conditions of a change is capable of 
providing a response to the partial failure of a property 
detachment/stabilisation procedure. But the identification of the motivations 
for such a pro- gramme is insufficient. We need now to indicate how it 
might be brought to its term, in everyday practice as well as in that of the 
laboratory. The difficulty to be solved, as is well known at least since 
Kant’s critique of Hume, is passing from a series of properties or events 
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which simply is, to a sequence which must be. The difficulty involves, in 
other words, not being content with an observation of succession, but of 
establishing a relationship of necessary consequentiality. Now, a modal 
concept like that of necessity makes operative, alongside an indicative-
mode description of what actually happens, a conditional-mode description 
of what would happen in case of modifica- tion of elements of the series of 
properties or events. Only the renewed inclusion of the concept of action 
beside that of event will introduce, according to von Wright, following 
Piaget and many other cognitive science specialists, the component of 
conditionalisation indispensable for us to arrive at distinguishing the flatly 
factual from the necessary. An action effectively defines itself as that which 
interferes with the course of things, that is, as that which prevents 
something happening which otherwise would have happened, or on the 
other hand which causes to happen something which would not have 
happened otherwise. The rule-associated accomplishment of these two 
types of operation is what allows a relation of causality to be established. 
Let us consider these in the order given above, which is also the order of 
their definitional importance. Let’s suppose we are confronted with the 
habitual succession of an event X and an event Y. The interference 
consisting in preventing X from happening in a sufficient number of 
sequences of events of this type allows us to establish a counterfactual 
proposition which is valid for those sequences outside of the interference 
situations. More precisely, what should be said if, both at this stage as at 
that of the simple observation, one wanted to avoid the well-known 
difficulties around induction, is that an interference of this type leads us to 
act under the presupposition of the validity of a certain counterfactual 
proposition, or else that it leads us to anticipate series of events which 
would conform to what a counterfactual proposition would affirm. 
Whatever the case, this counterfactual proposition can take two forms: 
either ‘if X had not happened, Y would have happened anyway’, or ‘if X 
had not happened, Y would not have happened’. The first pro- position 
unambiguously affirms the accidental character of this succession. 
According to David Lewis (1986: 167) it is sufficient in itself to define a 
relation of causality: ‘If X and Y are two actual events such that Y would 
not have occurred without X, then X is a cause of Y.’ But if that is so, there 
follow important consequences for the relationship between causality and 
determinism. 
On the one hand, when the only criterion allowing X to be qualified as 
the cause of Y rests on the counterfactual proposition ‘if X hadn’t happened, 
Y would not have happened’, the factual proposition associated with a 
particular occurrence of X, be it ‘X happened and Y followed’ or on the 
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other hand ‘X happened and Y did not follow’, matters little. According to 
the type of definition proposed by Lewis and quite widely adopted, X can 
thus be a cause of Y without nevertheless determining it. 
On the other hand, the definition of a cause appears much more plastic 
than that of a genuine determining factor. Designating an event X such that, 
had it not occurred, Y would not have followed, is an operation whose 
result can depend without any difficulty on the degree of precision with 
which X is circumscribed. Nothing forbids conceiving that where, on a first 
level of approximation, the prevention of occurrence of a very roughly 
circumscribed X has led to the non-occurrence of Y, one can label X as the 
cause of Y; then secondly that, when experimental meth- ods had improved 
to the extent of proving that the selective impediment of a part x of X is 
enough to bring about the non-occurrence of Y, only x is then labelled as 
the cause of Y. Neither does anything forbid that a limitation of experiment 
(which can be incompressible) should render it impossible to refine the 
selective impedance procedure beyond an imperfect degree corresponding 
to X, without for all that that one should renounce labelling that roughly 
circumscribed X as, by the force of circumstance, a cause of Y. 
The other operation allowing difference to be made between the 
necessary and the contingent aspect of changes consists of having occur an 
antecedent X event which would not have happened otherwise. This 
operation leads to establishing (presupposing, anticipating) either the 
counterfac- tual proposition ‘if X had happened, Y would not necessarily 
have happened’, or the counterfactual proposition ‘if X had happened, Y 
would have happened’. The first of these propositions, as we have seen, is 
compatible with the proposition that X is a cause of Y. But the second 
proposition adds something important to this affirmation: if it is conjointly 
valid with that which affirms the non-occurrence of Y when X does not 
occur, one can infer from it that X is the determinant cause of Y. As one 
might expect, however, the plasticity of the delimitation of the determinant 
cause is much slighter that that of a cause pure and simple. One is within 
one’s rights to be satisfied, for a simple cause, with the broad definition: X 
= x1 or x2 or . . . xn , even if it proves in the end that only xi responds to the 
condition of the non-occurrence of Y in its absence. On the other hand, it is 
not possible to affirm that X = x1 or x2 or . . . xn is the determinant cause of 
Y if only xi responds to the occurrence condition of Y in its presence (for in 
the circumstances where the occurrence of X translates as that of xk≠xi, it 
can happen that Y will not occur). It is this characteristic of extreme 
selectivity that confers on the concept of the determinant cause a value of a 
regulatory ideal of discrimination for experimental practice: an 
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experimental protocol is habitually not reckoned to have reached a 
definitive conclusion until it has allowed determinant causes to be isolated. 
Recognising a delimiting marker in the search for determinant causes would 
incontesta- bly represent a differential with respect to this regulatory ideal. 
But the major lesson of the preceding analysis is that the more general 
demand to establish relationships of (simple) causality would not 
necessarily be affected by it. 
From this discussion we can better appreciate the sense (and the 
misunderstandings) of the debate on indeterminism and causality in 
quantum physics. This debate has a dual historical ori- gin. One is found in 
the probabilistic interpretation of wave function, proposed by Max Born in 
1926, the other in the introduction of ‘uncertainty’ relations by Werner 
Heisenberg in 1927. Hypostatising his probabilistic interpretation, Born 
(1983: 54) was inclined to ‘[...] give up determinism in the world of atoms’. 
As for Heisenberg (1983: 83), he made much of his ‘uncertainty relations’ 
to declare that ‘[...] quantum mechanics establishes the final failure of 
causality’. In the face of this double challenge the responses were not long 
in coming. But they contained gaps by reason of an imperfect perception of 
what was not present in quantum physics, whether in relation to classical 
ideals or with respect to a certain Kantian constituent principle. Among the 
responses, we will there pick out those that assert that quantum mechanics 
imposes no true limit to the search for a relation of strict determination 
between successive events, and those which, while admitting there is such a 
limit, recommend modifying the task of identifying the causes rather than 
giving it up. Finer distinctions between these positions will be drawn as we 
proceed. 
The first series of objections addressed the very strong conclusion 
Heisenberg had come to. After all, as Heisenberg himself recognised (ibid.) 
‘what is wrong in the sharp formulation of the law of causality, ‘‘When we 
know the present precisely, we can predict the future,’’ is not the 
conclusion but the assumption.’ In other words, it is uniquely due to the 
incompressible limit imposed by the ‘uncertainty’ relations at the present 
determination of the couple of variables defining the classical state of a 
material point, that no determined future value could be derived from it. But 
is that sufficient to justify ‘the ultimate failure of causality’, as Heisenberg 
was proclaiming at that time? From 1929 Hugo Bergmann was showing 
that this question should be answered in the negative. It is effectively 
incorrect to infer the invalidity of the hypothetical asser- tion expressing the 
causal relationship between present and future states by taking as a starting 
point the indeterminacy of the present state. ‘A logical implication, 
Bergmann emphasized, is not refuted by disproving the validity of its 
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premise or hypothesis’ (Jammer 1974: 75). This objection was also 
addressed to Heisenberg at the beginning of the 1930s by Alexandre Kojève 
and Ernst Cassirer, apparently independently. 
It remains to determine what attitude should be properly adopted when 
faced with this reopen- ing of the question of causality in quantum physics. 
The simplest, one might well say reactionist, attitude amounts to rushing 
into the breach left open by Heisenberg and giving free rein once again to 
the regulatory ideal of strict determinism. The most direct method of 
achieving this is to elaborate a programme of theories of hidden vari- ables 
governed by determinist laws. The idea here is that the impossibility of 
experimentally defining the set of values of relevant variables for the 
evolution of a physical system should not prevent their being held as 
defined in theoretical description. This theoretical definition of the variables 
allows them to be linked among themselves by determinist laws, and to put 
back the random character of their distribution on to the initial conditions 
(and on to processes of determi- nist chaos which exponentially amplify 
their fluctuations). Since the so-called ‘impossibility of hidden variable’ 
theorems, such as that of von Neumann, have failed to definitively block 
this path, and the other theorems such as those of Bell or Kochen and 
Specker have managed only to identify the general characteristics of this 
type of theory, the only objections that may still reason- ably be addressed 
to them are of a philosophical type. What are then those theories which 
extend the field of representation into a domain that they themselves define 
as meta-empirical by principle? What credit should be accorded to those 
attempts to disassociate the form of objectivity from any possibility of 
implementing concrete procedures of objectification? 
The question of the link between the pursuit of the determinist regulatory 
ideal and the experimental accessibility of the postulated processes has also 
been the object of intense discussion among several authors who 
nevertheless are not declared partisans of hidden variable theories. 
Heisenberg, to start with, noted in his 1929 Chicago lectures that 
‘uncertainty’ relations do not apply to the past: it is perfectly conceivable to 
reconstitute a trajectory determined a posteriori by carrying out two 
successive measurements of the position as precise as one wishes, and by 
inferring as a result of that the value of the momentum prior to the second 
measurement. But, he added ‘this knowledge of the past is of a purely 
speculative character, since it can never [...] be subjected to experimental 
verification’ (Heisenberg 1930: 20). In contrast to this verificationist 
rejection of retrospective reconstructions of trajectories, Popper (1995: 232) 
made the observation that the hypothesis of a trajectory (whether 
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retrospective or prospective) is refutable, and that it is therefore not correct 
to refuse it any ‘empirical significance’. But what Popper forgot to say was 
that reconstituted or projected trajectories, though in principle refutable, are 
in quantum physics affected by an extreme form of underdetermination by 
the experiment. Not only does the actual corpus of experiments not allow 
choosing in practice between the multiplicity of trajectories not refuted by 
this corpus, but also fundamental limitations of the experimentation 
(inscribed in the ‘uncertainty’ relations or implied by the contextualist 
character of hidden variable theories capa- ble of reproducing the 
predictions of quantum theory) render this choice impossible in principle. 
The theoretical descriptions of trajectories by determinist law carry in the 
end the speculative tenor denounced by Heisenberg; and that independently 
of his initially verificationist option. 
Overcoming this element of the arbitrary while at the same time also 
having recourse to retro- spective reconstructions was the principal self-
assigned goal of G. Hermann, a young German woman philosopher and 
mathematician who developed her conceptions in contact with Werner 
Heisenberg’s research group. The interest presented by her work resides in 
its being considered from one end to the other as an attempt to save Kantian 
epistemology from its alleged refutation by twentieth-century physics (and 
in particular by Heisenberg’s emphatic sidelining of the principle of 
causality (2002)). The strategy underpinning Hermann’s work consisted in 
clearly dissociating the consequentiality of events by means of a rule, and 
from the possibility of using that rule for predicting future events from past 
events. Hermann insisted that the fact that exact pre- diction of events is 
often impossible in quantum physics does not prevent their being linked 
together according to a rule that is identifiable a posteriori. In difference 
from Heisenberg, how- ever, retrospective reconstruction does not bear 
exclusively upon a corpuscular trajectory. It combines, following the 
pragmatic method recommended by Bohr for the application of the concept 
of complementarity, descriptive moments employing particle representation 
and other descriptive moments employing wave representation (Hermann 
1996: 93–94, 97–100). The advantage of such a reconstruction in 
comparison to Heisenberg’s is that it presents as in part able to be 
corroborated by subsequent experiment. It is corroborable because, by re-
ascending the chain of determinations of an agent of measurement (say a 
photon) starting out from an ultimate phenomenon (say the impact of this 
photon on a photographic plate), one can retrospectively assign a wave 
function to the measured object (say an electron); and because this wave 
function, in its turn, leads to making testable (probabilistic) predictions. The 
problem, as pertinently pointed out by L. Soler (ibid., 128 ff.) is that, in the 
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same manner as the Heisenberg-Popper corpuscular reconstructions, 
Hermann’s mixed (wave and corpuscular) reconstructions are by principle 
underdetermined by the attestation procedures: a large number of distinct 
sequences of alternated corpuscular and wave processes arrive exactly at 
the same probabilistic predictions. 
The most interesting aspect of Hermann’s considerations no doubt 
resides then in her attempt to explain the dissociation between strict 
predictability and the applicability of a principle of caus- ality to quantum 
phenomena. In her view, if the consequentiality rule that governs 
microscopic processes cannot serve to predict them, it is because it 
determines them only in a manner relative to the result of the final 
measurement from which one then can reconstruct them. The cause, wrote 
Hermann (ibid., 94; cf. 90, 100, 119), ‘belongs to a process only relatively 
to a link to the observation’. In other words, the reason why predictive use 
of the principle of causality is impossible in microscopic physics is that one 
of the principal preliminary conditions for its establishment, that is the 
condition of detachment of a certain set of events or properties with regard 
to their modes of manifestation, is not fulfilled. The unpredictability of the 
phenomena is here a consequence of their contextuality. Unfortunately, 
Hermann did not properly take in the lessons provided by her analysis on 
the subject of the moment priority order of the procedure of the constitution 
of objec- tivity. This lack of insight led her to a purely allegorical 
application of the causality principle by having it exclusively carried on the 
back of retrospective reconstructions of doubtful validity. But how did she 
get to that point? 
To recapitulate, the end-point at which Hermann arrived, whether she 
was satisfied with it or not, was that the possibility of phenomena 
prediction, which alone permits the experimental cor- roboration of causal 
relations, rests on a prior constitution of objectivity in the form of a carried- 
through procedure of detachment/stabilisation of properties or events. 
However, under the influ- ence of a residual Kantian orthodoxy, she 
persisted in inverting the order of priorities that she her- self had established. 
She made the objectivity of microscopic physics depend on an application 
of the principle of causality to reconstructed part-corpuscular part-
waveform ‘intermediary processes’. The problem is that the intermediary 
processes in question are fictive, and applying to them the principle of 
causality by this fact arises also out of a fiction. We should recall that 
constituting an objectivity, in transcendental philosophy, supposes above all 
operations of synthesis of the perceptions, or else of synthesis of the 
experimental phenomena. But Hermann refers only to syntheses of 
‘interphenomena’ in the Reichenbachian sense; in other words to syntheses 
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which bear throughout on interpolated representations, partially arbitrary as 
not being individually testable, between the phenomena proper. She thus 
causes the procedure of constituting objectivity to become disengaged, and 
minimises the fact that it is precisely because of the unavailability of the 
most elementary foundation for the constitution of objectivity, that is, 
because of the impossibility of applying the antecedent condition of 
detachment/stabilisation of properties through ‘triangulation’ of several 
simultaneous or successive phenomena that she resorts to this extreme 
solution. 
Drawing the lessons of Hermann’s attempts, we must now restart on 
sounder bases by turning back to the experimental phenomena themselves. 
As Cassirer (1956: 125) writes, ‘From the point of view of physics, 
however, only those values are permissible that can be determined by a 
certain mode of measurement which must be accurately stipulated. Only 
through this limiting condition does the ‘‘causal principle’’ attain a 
physically comprehensible significance – and its legitimate application 
remains confined to this condition’. But of course, once one has forbidden 
oneself from restricting the field of application of constitutive methods to a 
nether world of interphenome- nal processes, one cannot avoid accepting a 
certain limitation of the regulatory ideal of strict determination. But does 
that necessarily imply a destructive renunciation of the very task of the 
constitution of objectivity? The current view is that that indeed is the case. 
Hermann thus consid- ered that, from a Kantian perspective, the 
abandonment of the search for determinant causes was equivalent to the 
abandonment of objectification. Numerous passages from the Critique of 
Pure Reason seem able to be quoted in support of this thesis, as for example 
this: ‘The proposition that nothing happens through blind chance [...] is 
therefore an a priori law of nature’ (Kant 1964: 248 [A228–B280]). If one 
considers that a merely probabilistic association between antecedents and 
consequents does arise from ‘blind chance’, one is tempted to infer from 
that that, according to Kant, it is only by means of the establishment of a 
determinist law that it can be a question of a nature. Gordon Brittan (1994) 
has nevertheless warned against this assimilation and against the hasty 
conclusion that it leads to. According to him the proposition, ‘everything 
that happens is hypothetically necessary’ by which Kant (ibid.) summarises 
the principle of causality, is sufficiently broad for accepting as suitable a 
causal relationship in the minimal sense defined by David Lewis, and hence 
of a merely probabilistic link. The ‘blind chance’ that Kant excludes does 
not equate to the simple fact of the intervention of probabilities less than 1, 
but to the absence of any possibility of linking successive events through a 
rule, even were it not strictly determinant. The idea of laws bearing 
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mediately on probabilities rather than immediately on events was moreover 
not completely foreign to Kant. Evidence for this is found in a reference to 
‘constant natural laws’ (Kant 1971: 41) governing the overall number of 
marriages or changes in the weather which are yet unpredictable on an 
individual level; and also an observation according to which the calcula- 
tion of probabilities contains ‘quite certain judgements on the degree of 
possibility of certain cases under given homogeneous conditions, in which 
the sum of all must happen quite infallibly according to the rule, although in 
respect of every particular incident the rule is not sufficiently determined’ 
(Kant 1953: 138). 
To avoid the trap of a thorough-going (and sometimes misunderstood) 
literal application to quantum physics of Kant’s prescriptions, we now need 
to come back to the most elementary process of objectification of a change 
in the phenomena, then consider how (and to what extent) this can be made 
functional with respect to often random microscopic phenomena. The 
problem that presents here, as we have seen, is to discriminate between (a) 
an alteration component due to the more or less poorly mastered interaction 
of the milieu explored and the apparatus of exploration, and (b) an 
alteration component that nothing prevents from being treated as it were 
attributable in proper to the milieu explored. In short, one seeks a separation 
between an element of the change that is irremediably contextual and an 
element that is decontextualised from it. When nothing gets in the way, in a 
certain class of experiment (let’s call it the test class), of sufficiently 
controlling the antecedents so as to establish associations of strict 
determination between them and the conse- quents of a given type, such a 
separation is relatively easily obtainable. The rule established within the 
context of the test class can in effect serve, in counterfactual fashion, as a 
discrimination criterion outside of the test class. The alteration element 
conforming to this prior-established rule is imputable to the objects 
themselves, while the additional element of alteration is imputable to 
modifications (controlled or otherwise) of the relation between the objects 
and the modes of inves- tigation. But how can you arrive at the same result 
when the degree of control of the antecedents is limited by principle? How 
can this point be reached in the validity domain of quantum physics, where 
the fixing of an experimental disposition involves an incompressible 
indetermination on couples of values of conjugated variables, as per the 
Heisenberg relations? 
Let’s suppose for example that an experimental disposition (let’s say a 
light source and a collimator) is characterised by a range of values x0±Δx0 
for the value of the spatial co-ordinate x, and by a corresponding range of 
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values px±Δpx (Δpx≈h/Δx0) for the variable ‘component according to Ox 
of the momentum’. Suppose also that we measure a certain value x* of the 
variable x at a point sufficiently far away from the preparation. How can a 
discrimination be made in (x0-x*) between a contextual variation of x, 
depending on the unanalysable momentary configuration of the totality of 
the experimental set-up (including the disposition and the measuring 
apparatus) and a decontextualised variation, justifiably qualifiable as 
objective, of the same variable? 
The answer to this question is that one can generally not do so if one 
keeps to this single mea- sured value. But everything changes however 
when interest is directed to a distribution of numer- ous values of the 
variable x after reiteration of the ‘same’ experimental disposition and of the 
‘same’ distant measurement x*. The statistical parameters of the 
distribution (such as the mean quadratic separation) effectively obey laws 
that are independent of circumstances, attested through the avenue of a test 
class of maximally controlled experimental preparations. These distribution 
laws alternatively can take the form of Schrödinger’s equation governing 
evolution of a wave function, or those of Hamiltonian equations bearing on 
self-adjoint operators called ‘observables’. In the developed example, the 
laws of this type eventuate in following expression of the mean quadratic 
separation of the value of x as a function of the time t that has elapsed since 
the disposition: 
Δx=ht/2πmΔx0    (where h represents Planck’s constant). 
 Thus one is justified in asserting that, in a given variation of the value of 
x between 0 and t, the ‘objective’ element (that is, that which is 
decontextualised and universal) of the change is that which contributes to 
the growth of the mean quadratic separation according to the above- 
mentioned law. And the contextual element of the change, depending 
unanalysably on the overall configuration of each particular experiment 
carried out, is all the rest. 
These observations on the impossibility of objectifying change on any 
other plane but the sta- tistical have as their theoretical correlative, as we 
have seen, the application of determinist laws solely to the generative 
symbols of probabilistic evaluations that, for example, state vectors are. 
Coupled with the standard reading of the Second Analogy and with 
considerations of the two other Analogies of Experience (Bitbol 1998), 
such observations lead to an acceptance that in quantum physics the locus 
of objectivity has been displaced from the ordinary space in which the 
phenomena occur to the Hilbert space in which state vectors evolve. This 
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effectively purely for- mal status of the object in quantum physics is 
considerably far removed, it is true, from the resi- dual concrete 
representations still carried, despite all the associated paradoxes and 
difficulties, by the vehicular mode of expression of physicists in terms of 
‘particles’ subjected to ‘collisions’. This is consequently not without raising 
a certain perplexity. What is that objective entity whose experimental 
contact can only be established on a statistical level? Is it not possible to 
find for it a more direct experimental correlative which, by analogy with 
that of ‘particles’, would put in play an individual measurement process? It 
has long been thought that this question can only be answered in the 
negative. But in 1993, physicists of Yakir Aharonov’s team brought to light 
a class of ‘protective’ or ‘adiabatic’ experimental procedures potentially 
capably of giving access to mean values or mean quadratic separations from 
a single measurement (Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman 1993; Dickson 
1995). The determinist law governing the evolutionary equation of the state 
vectors thus translates concretely to a strict predictability of the distributive 
values sup- plied by adiabatic measurements. The probabilistic anticipation 
provided by the state vector has henceforth a direct and individual 
experimental fulfilment. 
In summary, we have now shown that the second moment of the process 
of objectification, assured by the application of the principle of causality, 
has a definite corresponding moment in quantum physics; and that despite 
the failure (or the limitation to a solely ‘unsharp’ degree) of the first 
moment of the process of objectification, that of ‘detachment/stabilisation’. 
This correspond- ing moment fulfils to a satisfactory extent its elementary 
function, which is to isolate a decontex- tualised fraction of the change, by 
separating out its contextual fraction. It accommodates a broad, though not 
necessarily determinist, conception of the causal link between successive 
events, and delegates the shape of strict determination to the relation 
between successive statistical distribu- tions in the Hilbert space of the state 
vector representing a given experimental preparation. It does not demand 
application to a meta-empirical universe, whether this be that of hidden 
variables and processes, or that of retrospective reconstructions of 
interphenomenal sequences. 
3. Probabilities and objectivity 
In the previous section, we identified both the likely origin and the 
principal consequence of the non-predictability of individual (non-
adiabatic) microphysical phenomena. The origin of the non- predictability, 
sketched in outline by G. Hermann, illustrated by the image of the 
‘disturbance’ of the object by the measuring agent, and confirmed on a 
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more general theoretical level by Paulette Destouches-Février (1951: 260–
280) is that the potential determinant causes of a phenomenon cannot be 
detached from it; that they are relative to the circumstances themselves of 
its production at the moment of a measurement. The double consequence of 
non-predictability is that: (1) the symbolism of quantum theory has an 
essentially probabilistic character, and (2) the procedure for the extraction 
of a decontextualised fraction of change is deflected from the individual 
phenomena to their statistical distributions. The task that remains to be 
achieved in this section consists of establishing a precise link between the 
(contextual) origin and the (structurally probabilistic) consequence of non-
predictability. More precisely, it consists of showing that the form of the 
quantum calculation of the probabilities carries the mark of the 
contextuality of the phenomena on which it bears. 
An initial approach, which I will simply summarise here after having 
expounded it in detail elsewhere (Bitbol 1997, 1998), starts out from the 
dual constraint of contextuality and the demand for unicity of the 
intercontextual predictive tool in order to arrive at the base structure of 
quantum mechanics. Within the context of this approach, it may first be 
noted that the metacontextual languages with the capacity to unify the 
contextual experimental languages typical of microphysics are isomorphic 
to the ‘quantum logic’ of Birkhoff and Von Neumann (Heelan 1970). It will 
then be shown, based on a generalised version of Pythagoras’s theorem 
(Février 1956; Hughes 1989), that the formalism of the vectors of the 
Hilbert space, complemented by Born’s rule which permits the calculation 
of probabilities from a state vector, takes fully into account the 
contextuality of phenomena to be predicted and satisfies the unicity clause 
of the predictive tool (it is even one of the simplest of the formalisms of this 
type). 
A second approach, to which I would like to devote a certain attention in 
this section, is the exact reciprocal of the first. Instead of re-ascending, as in 
the first approach, from the fact of the contextuality to the structure of 
quantum mechanics, its sets itself the goal of descending from the structure 
of the quantum calculation of the probabilities to the non-
decontextualisation of the phenomena that it serves to anticipate. 
As has been shown by Itamar Pitowsky (1994), this second, descending, 
approach of the probability-contextuality linkage can stand on the analysis 
undertaken by George Boole of the constraints that logic exercises on the 
calculation of probabilities. What Boole (1958, 1952) emphasises is that, 
when one assigns probabilities to a set of events, one cannot avoid taking 
account of the logical link between events; one must for example take into 
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account that an event represents the conjunction of several others, or that it 
is implied by another. When we assign prob- abilities, he wrote ‘we are not 
at liberty to proceed arbitrarily. We are subject, first, to the formal Laws of 
Thought, which determine the possible conceivable combinations’ (Boole 
1952: 390). That means that we cannot content ourselves with imposing on 
probabilities the requirement to be individually included between 0 and 1. 
To that one must add relations between them, which guar- antee that they 
respect the logical constraints proper to the event universe to which they are 
asso- ciated term by term. One of these relations was enunciated much later 
by Kolmogorov (1950) in the form of an equality, in his third axiom of the 
classical theory of probabilities. According to this axiom, ‘the probability of 
the union of two events is the same as the sum of the probabilities, if the 
two events are mutually exclusive’. But Boole proposed a much more 
general type of con- straint relationship between probabilities, in the form 
of inequalities extending to all permitted types of logical relations between 
events (and in particular to the cases where the events are not mutually 
exclusive, that is, where they do have elements in common). The non-
satisfaction of these inequalities would in his view indirectly reveal a major 
distancing with respect to the ele- mentary logic of events and properties 
upon which probabilistic evaluations are supposed to bear. In the terms 
inspired by Kant that Boole chose, if these inequalities were not satisfied, 
that would mean that the ‘conditions of a possible experience’ would not be 
respected by the chosen probabilistic assignation. 
A quotation in extenso from Boole (1952: 392) would not be without 
value at this point of the exposition: 
Let p1, p2, ...pN represent the probabilities given in the data. As these will in 
general not be the probabilities of unconnected events, they will be subject to 
other conditions than that of being positive proper fractions, viz. to other 
conditions beside: 
 p1≥0,  p2≥0, ...pN≥0 
 p1≤1,  p2≤1, ...pN≤1 
Those other conditions will, as will hereafter be shown, be capable of 
expression by equations or inequations reducible to the general form: 
a1p1+ a2p2+...+ aNpN+a≥0 
These, together with the former, may be termed the conditions of possible 
experience. When satisfied they indicate that the data may have, when not 
satisfied they indicate that the data cannot have resulted from actual 
observation. 
Taken literally, these phrases mean that when someone gives us a list of 
values p1, p2, ...pN, we can be sure that they cannot have resulted from an 
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experimental evaluation of frequencies of determinations in a single sample 
of objects if they do not respect the above inequalities. A difficulty of this 
text of Boole’s is that it closely mingles, though in comprehensible fashion, 
consid- erations that are logical, gnoseological and ontological in character. 
The logical considerations bear upon the connections (conjunction, 
disjunction, implication, etc.) between propositions refer- ring to events; the 
gnoseological considerations concern what it is or is not possible to observe 
as frequencies following random draws; and the ontological considerations, 
implicitly supposed as subtending the two previous sets of considerations 
by way of the unicity clause of the sample, relate to the articulation of the 
properties in the objects of the sample that are submitted to a ran- dom draw. 
Appropriately drawing the consequences of the third sort of considerations, 
Peter Mittelstaedt (1998: 93) has accentuated the transcendental 
significance of Boole’s inequalities, declaring that they represent nothing 
less than the conditions to be fulfilled for numbers to be ‘ [...] considered as 
probabilities for properties [...] of some object of experience’. When they 
are satisfied, they carry the probabilistic trace of a prior constitution of 
objectivity in the first sense of detachment/stabilisation of properties of 
individual objects. Inversely, when they are not satisfied, they lead to 
suspecting the non-achievement of a constitution of objectivity of this type. 
Two examples will allow us to understand the close linkage between 
Boolean inequalities and properties of objects of experiment. The first, very 
simple, example concerns the type of experi- ment involving drawing balls 
from a barrel which currently serves as a paradigm for probabilistic 
evaluation. Suppose that coloured balls are being drawn from a broad 
sample, and one is inter- ested in their colour (red, white or black) and the 
material they are made of (wood, metal, stone). According to the standard 
rules of the calculation of probabilities, the probability that a ball is red or 
made of wood is equal to the sum of the probability that it is red and the 
probability that it is wooden, minus the probability that it is both red and 
wooden. If we index the predicate ‘red’ by 1, and ‘wooden’ by 2, this 
probability for a ball to be red or wooden may be written: 
P=p1+p2-p12.  
 
Being a probability, P obeys the general condition of being less than or 
equal to 1.  One thus obtains the following inequality, constraining the 
relationship between p1, p2, p12, and having exactly Boole’s requisite form: 
1-p1-p2+p12≥0        [1] 
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It remains to be understood why any list of givens that did not obey that 
inequality would depart from the Boolean domain of a ‘possible 
experience’. To that effect let us consider a list of givens of frequency that 
massively violates the above inequality: p1=1, p2=1, et p12=0.  Read in the 
ontological mode, this list of givens signifies that all the balls are red, and 
that all the balls are wooden, but that no ball is both red and wooden. It 
does not authorise the conjunction of predi- cates in one ball, while 
imposing that they are attributed to it separately. It thus accords neither 
with classic (Boolean) logic, nor with the structure of objects that this latter 
presupposes. Only the adoption of a non-classical logic and engagement 
with respect to an ontology conforming to this alternative logic, would open 
the possibility of not automatically rejecting the above list of givens into the 
domain of error. Read in the epistemological mode, however, this list lends 
itself to both more numerous and more nuanced interpretations. Within the 
context of a conception of experience prejudiced in favour of the 
constitution of objectivity, that is, one which held it obligatorily to be a 
faithful reflection of the pre-existent properties of permanent objects, the 
conclusion previously obtained on the ontological level would be, it is true, 
immediately transposable to the level of knowledge. Since the list of givens 
accords neither with classical logic nor with the ontology which subtends it, 
no ‘experience’ of objects conforming to that logic and that ontology could 
in that case correspond to it; it would thus depart from the context of a 
‘possible experience’ in this limited sense that it could not translate the 
specular experience of a world endowed with a Boolean logic and ontology. 
But everything changes if we consider either, that the experimental 
phenomenon is the fruit of a reciprocal and ‘disturbing’ interaction between 
the object and the process of investigation, or, better, that one should not 
too rigidly prejudge a constitution of objectivity when beginning to 
interpret phenomena, for the sound reason that a constitution of objectivity 
is suspended by the universally valid type of organisation to which one can 
submit these phenomena at the end of the process. If it is firstly accepted 
that the phenomena result from a reciprocal disturbance interaction, nothing 
prevents all the objects which were subjected to the experimental evaluation 
procedure for colours giving the result ‘red’, nor all those that were 
subjected to the experimental evaluation procedure for the material giving 
the result ‘wooden’, but that those which were simultaneously subjected to 
both experimental procedures not giving the result ‘red and wooden’ (all 
that is required is to imagine that the procedure for evaluation of the 
material affects the tonality accessible to the procedure for colour 
evaluation). A list of givens violating Boole’s inequality does not therefore 
depart from the context of possible experience of a world furnished with a 
Boolean logic and ontology, as long as the experi- ence in question is not 
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passive and specular but active and ‘disturbing’. This list of frequency 
givens violating Boole’s inequalities is not any more the sign of a departure 
from the context of all possible experience if it is admitted that the 
phenomena are the initial material of a project of constitution of objectivity, 
rather that the manifestation (whether faithful or deformed by 
‘disturbance’) of a universe of preconstituted objectivity. It can mean in this 
case that the modalities for the constitution of objectivity by which it is 
necessary to proceed from the givens in question are profoundly different 
from those habitually applied from givens that do obey the Boolean 
inequalities. It may also mean that no procedure of constitution of 
objectivity of the first order can be successfully achieved, but that a second-
order objectification procedure (that is, a procedure for the objectification 
of the methods of production and anticipation of non-objectifiable 
phenomena as properties of objects) remains concei- vable. The number of 
degrees of freedom of a ‘possible experience’ is, in sum, much greater than 
Boole envisaged. The non-satisfaction of the probabilistic conditions posed 
by Boole nevertheless remains an extremely valuable indicator as to the 
inadaptability of a domain of phenomena to the common presuppositions of 
objectivity preconstitution. 
A second, somewhat more complex example (Pitowsky 1994) will now 
allow us to realise that the Boole inequalities form a ‘genus’ of which the 
Bell inequalities are a ‘species’ (the fortuitous play of assonances between 
the two proper names can provide a useful mnemonic for retaining the 
parallel). The example will show by the same occasion how the issue of 
non-locality came to be introduced, on the occasion of the great inventory 
imposed by the absence of conformity between (a) the frequencies of 
micro-level phenomena and (b) the belief that these phenomena faithfully 
show the properties of objects obeying a Boolean logic and ontology. 
The first stage, under this perspective, consists of deriving a Boolean 
inequality holding true for three events able to incorporate common 
elements, instead of two as previously. Following the classical calculation 
of probabilities, with the three properties respectively indexed by 1, 2 and 3, 
the probability of their disjunction (e1 or e2 or e3) is: 
p1+p2+p3-p12-p13-p23+p123 . 
 
As with all probabilities, this is less than 1: 
p1+p2+p3-p12-p13-p23+p123≤1 
 
Thus a fortiori we get: 
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p1+p2+p3-p12-p13-p23≤1. 
 
Now, let us substitute for e2 its complement, denoted e 2 , in the event 
universe. That implies that for p2 we substitute 1- p2; for p12 we substitute 
p1-p12; and finally for p23 we substitute p3- p23. The preceding inequality 
thus becomes: 
p1+(1-p2)+p3-( p1-p12)-p13-( p3-p23)≤1 
or:   1-p2+p12-p13+p23≤1,  
 
Or further, to attain the exact form of Boole’s inequalities: 
p2-p12+p13-p23≥0. 
 
We can further simplify the above inequality by noticing that p2-p23 is no 
different from the con- joint probability of the event e2 and of the 
complement e 3  of e3. If we call this conjoint probability p23  the inequality 
becomes: 
p13+p 23-p 12≥0       [2] 
  
This latter inequality has exactly the form of a variety of Bell’s 
inequality that Bernard d’Espagnat (1979, 1975, 1978, 1984) proved from 
certain elementary ontological hypotheses; as elementary as that of the 
possibility for permanent objects (for example, particles) to conjointly 
possess three predicates. 
Let us demonstrate this. Let there be three predicates, denoted 1, 2, 3, 
and their negations, denoted 1 , 2 , 3 . Let us denote as nIJK the number of 
particles possessing the three predicates I, J, K; denote as NIJ the number of 
particles possessing two determined predicates I, J, with the third being left 
free. We then have: 
N12=n123+n123  
N13=n 123+n123  
N23=n123+n123  
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From these expressions, a very simple calculation arrives at the 
inequality:   
N13+ N23- N12≥0        [3] 
 
From this inequality [3] on the number of particles carrying three 
predicates there derives immediately the inequality [2] on the probabilities 
of triplets of events, and also another inequality of the same form on the 
phenomena frequencies found over a random series of experiments. At least, 
these two latter inequalities are valid if certain precise conditions are 
fulfilled: (a) if the statistical sampling applied during the random selection 
is not biased, (b) if one of the putative properties is not disturbed by the 
operation involved in manifesting the other, (c) if there is even a meaning in 
accepting as a starting position ‘a well-defined distribution of properties 
over some population’ (Pitowsky 1994: 107). The violation of inequalities 
of type [2] will also therefore reciprocally carry important lessons. By 
setting aside the still open possibility (a) of a systematic bias in the 
statistical sampling, it would mean either (b) that the relationship between 
properties and phenom- ena was not simply ‘specular’ but interactive and 
‘disturbing’, or (c) that the very presupposition of an always-already 
constituted objectivity (the belief that there is thereby a statistical 
distribution of objects furnished with properties detached from the 
processes eliciting their ‘manifestation’) is no longer operative. 
Now it is known that the quantum calculation of probabilities does not 
respect the type [2] inequalities, and that experiments in microphysics, in 
conformity with quantum predictions, do not respect the corresponding 
inequalities on the phenomena frequencies either. The question of what 
does the violation of these inequalities mean is thus sharply posed. Some 
researchers, though rather few in number, have invoked the option of 
statistical bias to explain the violation of these in experiment (Selleri 1994). 
But, besides the fact that there is no indicative evidence pointing in this 
direction and that this explanation would suppose a massive invalidation of 
quantum theory, which is scarcely plausible at this point in time, it has 
recently been able to be demonstrated that conditions of the same type as 
the Bell inequalities but valid for a single random selection were equally 
violated, both by the quantum calculation of the probabilities and by 
appropriate experi- ments (Bouwmester et al. 1999). In the presence of such 
single random draw experiments, the ‘out’ of statistical bias no longer 
exists. It remains therefore to explore the two other options (b) and (c). 
Explanation (b), which brings into play a ‘disturbance’ of one of the 
properties by the measur- ing of the other, was proposed very early on. The 
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problem is that the quantum calculation of the probabilities implies the 
violation of type [2] in every case, including when no disturbance seems to 
be able to invoked on the local level; for example, when (in the famous 
EPR thought experiment), interest was no longer directed to one particle on 
which were effected two measurements, but to two distant particles with 
correlated properties, on which one single measurement was carried out 
each time. These quantum predictions, implying the violation of Bell 
inequalities right up to and including locally non-disturbant situations, have 
been corroborated by a fairly large number of experiments, such as those 
conducted by Alain Aspect and his group. Several experiments of this 
family have even been conceived so as to not authorise, between the two 
distant particles, any influence at a speed inferior or equal to the speed of 
light in a vacuum (Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982). In such a situation, as 
is clear, the only way of continuing to support the validity of the 
‘disturbance’ explanation is to assert the existence of ‘supraluminal’ 
disturbance influences, whose nature remains a mystery, and which can 
have no application as far as the instantaneous transmission of information 
is concerned. If one wishes to avoid introducing such a speculative element 
into the interpretation of quantum mechanics, there remains, to account for 
the violation of the type [2] inequalities, only option (c) for recognising the 
insurmountable relativity of the phenomena vis-a`-vis the set of conditions 
of their manifestation. It is in this sense that one can say that the quantum 
calculation of probabilities bears the mark of an incompleteness of the 
procedure of detachment/stabilisation of properties from out of 
(microscopic) phenomena, and that it stands in fundamental distinction on 
this point from the classical calculation of probabilities implemen- ted in 
the majority of other stochastic theories. 
Admittedly, this family of contextualist readings of the violation of the 
Bell inequalities has long been known (it can be traced back to Bohr). But it 
has often been discussed, by its adver- saries as by some of its supporters, 
outside of the context of transcendentalist thought adopted in this article. 
From a transcendentalist perspective, all phenomena are held to be 
constitutively relative to their conditions of manifestation, and the structure 
of their concomitant or sequential sets which in some circumstances permits 
a first-instance objectification, in others does not so authorise it and impels 
the search for secondary forms of objectification. Objectivity is conceived 
of here as a ‘work to be achieved’ on one level or another, and not as a 
given which can sometimes be lacking. From a more current, non-
transcendentalist perspective, the conception of phenomena as a simple 
manifestation of a property of an object is the norm, and any attested 
divergence with respect to that norm is the sign that one has failed to grasp 
 31 
reality such as it is, independently of the methods of its exploration. From 
this, if the structure of the phenomena predicted by a theory (perhaps via a 
probabilistic mode) does not accord immediately with the presupposition of 
a pre-constituted objectivity of the usual type, only two readings of this 
theory are envisageable. Either one succeeds in conceiving a reality of a 
non-usual type able to be considered as described by the theory in question, 
and in this case one can say that the theory has been interpreted in the 
realist mode. Or alternately one finds obstacles to the conception of such a 
reality (for example that the divergence that it implied with respect to the 
familiar forms appears excessive, or that it proves to be too far removed 
from any possibility of experimental test), and in this case one has to be 
content with a non-realist interpretation of the theory, one that is purely 
predictive, with in the back of the mind the thought that a future theory will 
better manage than the present one to arrive at a faithful description of the 
real that is still being sought. 
From this flows the form taken by the discussions of the violation of Bell 
inequalities in the general context of non-transcendentalist thought. This 
discussion swings essentially between the conception of a massively non-
local reality and a pragmatically localist and non-realist interpreta- tion of 
quantum mechanics. The most complete version of the first position is 
Bohm’s theory of non-local hidden variables, whose very largely 
speculative tenor we have already touched on. As for the second position, it 
was envisaged in the following terms by Einstein (who suspected that Bohr 
also supported it): ‘There seems to me no doubt that those physicists who 
regard the descrip- tive methods of quantum mechanics as definitive in 
principle would react to this line of thought in the following way: they 
would drop the requirement for the independent existence of the physi- cal 
reality present in different parts of space; they would be justified in pointing 
out that the quan- tum theory nowhere makes explicit use of this 
requirement’ (Einstein 1971: 172 [letter of 5 April 1948 to Max Born]). The 
availability of a ‘non-realist’ (even ‘anti-realist’ in a sense close to that of 
Michael Dummett) option is thus recognised; but it is often perceived as 
being acceptable only with difficulty, for at least two types of reasons 
which we are now going to evaluate from a trans- cendentalist point of view. 
There is firstly the fear that the ‘antirealist’ choice would be 
accompanied by the loss of a value judged essential by science: the horizon 
of a convergence, beginning from appearances, towards a reality that is 
more profound than them. Einstein indicated unambiguously in a com- 
ment immediately following the quotation above that this was a loss that he 
would not accept, and because of that he held it necessary forthwith 
(including in the absence of any current threat of empirical refutation of 
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quantum mechanics) that a search should be undertaken for a post- quantum 
theory immediately interpretable as a description of the real. But everything 
changes in a transcendentalist perspective, where the directing value of 
objectification is methodologically dissociated from potential ambitions to 
reveal an intrinsic reality. For here, it little matters on what level the 
objectification has been accomplished (whether on the first level of spatio-
temporal phenomena, or on the second level of the formal instruments ⎜ψ〉  
of prediction), provided that it has been accomplished; and equally it little 
matters that everything should happen or not as if those formal instruments 
described a reality encompassing structures that are independent of oper- 
ations of experimental investigation. From this well understood 
transcendental point of view, quantum mechanics emerges as an exemplary 
success, and there is therefore no reason to want to go beyond it, as long as 
new modalities of experimental exploration have not allowed the emer- 
gence of phenomena transcending the limits of the context objectified by it. 
Another argument opposed to the ‘antirealist’ reading of quantum 
mechanics starts out from a reflection on Bell’s theorem. Since Bell’s 
inequalities could be derived from two major premises, currently called the 
‘locality hypothesis’ and the ‘reality hypothesis’, their violation leads to a 
questioning either of one, or of the other, or of both at the same time. 
Researchers who reject the hypothesis of locality but retain the hypothesis 
of reality are referred to as ‘realists’; those who reject the hypothesis of 
reality and retain that of locality are labelled as ‘localists’; and those who 
reject both hypotheses are called ‘nihilists’. If we set aside the so-called 
‘nihilist’ option, generally perceived as being too indiscriminate in its 
double rejection of these hypotheses, there remain to be discussed the 
‘realist’ and ‘localist’ options. The ‘localists’ can easily presume upon the 
clearly established impossibililty of using the EPR correlations for purposes 
of instantaneous transmission of information; if such is the case, they 
observe, the so-called non-locality has no other function but to explain the 
very EPR correlations which are thought to reveal it. Non-locality appears 
in this way to be a purely ad hoc explanation. But the ‘realists’ respond to 
this with an accusation of inconsistency in the ‘localist’ position (Chiao, 
Kwiat and Steinberg 1995; Chiao and Garrison 1999). The localists, they 
stress, establish an arbitrary dividing line between the properties con- 
cerning microscopic entities, which are purely and simply replaced by 
quantum ‘observables’, and the properties of space-time, which are treated 
on the macroscopic scale in the classical mode defined by the Special 
Theory of Relativity. This dividing line is the companion of the one semi- 
conventionally drawn by Bohr between the (microscopic) jurisdiction of 
quantum theory and the (macroscopic) jurisdiction of current language 
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complemented by a terminology borrowed from classical physics. It comes 
down to presenting as antirealist in the microscopic domain and realist in 
the macroscopic realm. ‘Localism’ is thus taxed with inconsistency and 
incompleteness, as its adopted critical position on the question of realism is 
only partial, and leaves aside an entire (macroscopic) part of the world. 
However, it is simple for ‘localists’ to reply to these objections by relying 
on a transcendentalist approach. For, from this latter perspective, it would 
no longer be a matter for them to lay down a rigid dividing line between 
one (microscopic) domain where one is limited simply to the prediction of 
phenomena, and another (macroscopic) domain related to a faithful 
description of the real; instead of that, ‘localists’ would assign themselves 
the task of dis- tinguishing, in plastic and stratified mode, regions of 
constituted objectivity and conditions of background objectification. In the 
case of quantum physics, the region of constituted objectivity is essentially 
the Hilbert space, with its state vectors, its operators, its amplitudes etc. and 
the back- ground objectification condition is the structure that a descriptive 
language of the type found in classical physics provides to the set of 
experimental set-ups and phenomena manifested on a macroscopic level.12 
On a stratum higher than the previous one, the region of constituted 
objectiv- ity is the classical universe of material bodies inserted in space 
and in time (including the set-ups involved in the constitution of the lower 
stratum) and the background objectification condition is a human cognitive 
process endowed with the Kantian armature of categories. 
What in summary constitutes the originality of the transcendental 
orientation is that the dividing lines that it draws are not based on any 
assertion of an ontological type. The background objectification conditions 
are not always of a different nature from the region of constituted 
objectivity; it is simply that, on a given constitutive stratum, they occupy a 
different function from the region of objects; and they can, on a different 
constitutive stratum, completely change func- tion, to the extent of finding 
themselves on the other side of the dividing line. There is not then, from 
this point of view, any in principle inconsistency or incompleteness in the 
‘localist’ and ‘antirealist’ position. There is no inconsistency because the 
two theoretical strata as defined by the ‘localist’ do not have the same 
epistemological status. And neither is there incompleteness because, if it is 
true that the sector of experimental set-ups and phenomena manifest on the 
macro- scopic level is sheltered from the critique of a language of realist 
form, this is only on a functional level. The macroscopic set-ups and 
phenomena play, in quantum physics, the role of a background condition, 
but this in no way implies that the mode of theorisation inaugurated by 
quantum phy- sics is inapplicable to them as of principle. The role of 
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constitutive background must at all times be taken by something; but this 
something can vary and can pass in part, when the need asserts itself, on to 
the side of the constituted foreground. One can conclude with the assertion 
that the ‘antirealist’ interpretation of quantum formalism, invited by the 
non-Boolean structure of its cal- culation of probabilities, is rendered both 
consistent and complete as long as the transcendental point of view is 
adopted. 
4. The transcendental status of decoherence 
We have just seen in what sense the quantum calculation of probabilities 
may be said to carry the trace of the contextuality of the phenomena on 
which it bears; their lack of detachment with respect to the instrumental 
conditions of their manifestation. This trace is the violation, in the general 
case, of the ‘(probabilistic) conditions of a possible experience’ as declared 
by George Boole. The problem is that, being a theory of physics, quantum 
mechanics has a vocation of universality. It is true that it supposes for its 
formulation, and no doubt for its interpretation, the setting aside of a meta-
theoretical background made up of experimental set-ups and phenomena 
described according to the norms of classical physics. But we have seen 
that, in a transcendentalist context, this setting aside could have no other 
significance than a purely functional one. Nothing should henceforth be 
able to escape by right from the jurisdiction of the contextual and predictive 
quantum mode of theorisation. The question which arises from that is to 
know how one can ensure compatibility between two apparently 
contradictory demands: the one being that any area at all of potential 
physical investigation, including that of the set-ups and phenomena 
manifested macro- scopically, should be considered as coming in principle 
under quantum jurisdiction; and the other being that macroscopic set-ups 
and manifestations exercise the role of background objectification 
conditions in the classical mode. This compatibility would demand nothing 
less than at least an approximate recovery of the validity of the 
‘(probabilistic) conditions of a possible experience’ (that is, of the Boolean 
inequalities) on the macroscopic scale, including when the quantum mode 
of theorisation is extended to this level. 
It is to the theories of decoherence that has been assigned the goal of 
proving the approximate validity of the Boolean inequalities in a 
macroscopic domain covered by quantum theory. They in effect allow the 
demonstration that, applied to complex interactive processes involving an 
object, a measuring apparatus and a vast environment, the quantum 
calculation of probabilities aligns to a very close degree of approximation 
with the classical calculation of probabilities in which, excepting any 
 35 
analysable anomaly of sampling or ‘disturbance’, the Boolean inequalities 
are auto- matically satisfied. Such a convergence of the quantum 
calculation towards the classical calculation of probabilities is made 
apparent through a near-disappearance of terms of interference typical of 
the quantum calculation of probabilities, and isomorphic to those of a wave 
process, to the advantage of a quasi-validation of the classical rule of 
additivity of the probabilities of a dis- junction. It is true that there are few 
physicists who have completely accepted this purely prob- abilistic 
formulation of the theories of decoherence. Some have even nurtured the 
hope of using decoherence as a way of explaining the emergence of a 
classical world out of a quantum world supposedly ‘described’ by a 
universal state vector (Gell-Mann 1997). The obstacle that they have struck 
in this is that, to reach a derivation, from a purely quantum calculation, of 
the classical laws and behaviours that prevail on the human scale, they have 
not been able to avoid introducing hypotheses containing anthropomorphic 
elements (Bitbol 1997: 410–418). The tri-part division of the chain of 
measurement into an object, an apparatus and an environment is, as is 
recognised by W.H. Zurek himself (1982), one of these hypotheses. For this 
division supposes that one has tacitly admitted the universality of the 
classical norm of the analytical separability of objects and properties, which 
the quantum domain precisely calls into question. Murray Gell-Mann’s 
(1995) recourse to a coarse graining of consistent histories is another 
hypothesis of this type, for this procedure is imposed only through the 
necessity of linking the descriptive content of consistent histories to the 
limited cognitive capacities of a set of anthropomorphic ‘Information 
Gathering and Utilizing Systems’. 
This form of begging the question which puts a blemish on the theories 
of decoherence is in reality only a fault in relation to the ‘realist’ reading of 
quantum mechanics: if one believes that a universal state vector has the 
capacity of describing the world, and if one aspires to see emerge, via the 
theories of decoherence, a classical world sector, the necessity of 
introducing an element of classicism from out of the theories of 
decoherence is effectively the sign of a failure. But, in the context of an 
‘antirealist’ reading of quantum mechanics in the transcendentalist spirit, 
the only thing that needs to be shown, as I have already emphasised, is the 
compatibility between the two epistemological functions assignable to the 
region of macroscopic experimental set-ups and manifestations: the 
function of the field of investigation being able to be included within 
quantum jurisdiction, and the function of a background capable of being 
described in a classical mode. And since there exist certain hypotheses 
(those of Zurek or Gell-Mann) within which the quan- tum calculation of 
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probabilities systematically violating the Boolean inequalities tends towards 
a classical calculation of probabilities which respects them in the general 
case, this compatibility is then assured. 
In sum, if the theories of decoherence have failed to demonstrate the 
necessary emergence of a classical world from out of the quantum world 
(which is what a ‘realist’ interpreter of quantum mechanics demands), they 
have managed to prove that there exist conditions which render possible the 
linkage between quantum and classical modes of theorisation (which would 
satisfy a transcendentalist interpreter of quantum mechanics, who demands 
simply that the function of pre-supposition of background that he assigns to 
macroscopic experimental set-ups and phenom- ena should not be 
obligatorily inscribed as being at odds with the universality ideal of 
quantum theory). The reasons for which it seems to me legitimate to assign 
a transcendental status to decoherence become clear from this. The first 
reason is that decoherence (re)introduces into the calculation of 
probabilities the feature of prior accomplishment of a procedure of 
detachment of properties of spatio-temporal objects, that is, the satisfaction 
of Boole’s inequalities. It is (re)con- stitutive of objectivity on the primary 
level of daily experience in space and time, emerging from out of the 
secondary level of objectivity of elements of the Hilbert-Fock spaces. The 
second rea- son is that decoherence guarantees the compatibility between: 
(a) the in principle unlimited char- acter of the quantum region of 
objectivity (on the secondary level of the Hilbert-Fock spaces), and (b) the 
prior condition for the constitution of that region of objectivity, that is, the 
description of the macroscopic set-ups and phenomena in a classic mode. 
The third reason is that this com- patibility has emerged as a simple 
possibility of co-adequation between the presuppositions and the theorems 
of quantum theory rather than as a necessary formal consequence of this 
latter. 
But could not someone, in the face of this assertion of the ‘transcendental 
status of decoherence’, question the circumstances of its experimental 
corroboration (Haroche, Brune and Raimond 1997; Haroche, Raimond and 
Brune 1997)? Is not decoherence henceforth to be considered as a tangible 
empirical fact rather than a transcendental precondition? Does it not arise 
from the a posteriori rather than from an a priori, however functional it 
might be? This objection in truth does no more than revive a current 
criticism addressed to transcendentalist initiatives; it raises the delicate 
question of the distinction between the constitutive and the empirical. The 
easiest way to reply to it is to draw a parallel with the case of causality, 
which we discussed earlier. After all, a nineteenth- century physicist could 
very well have raised, in opposition to the Kantian thesis of the 
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transcendental status of causality, the experimental observation of the 
regular succession of the phenomena studied by classi- cal physics; he 
could thus have confidently asserted an argument, decisive in his eyes, in 
favour of an empirical and a posteriori status for causality, rather than a 
transcendental and a priori one. To this argument, a philosopher of neo-
Kantian persuasion would have no doubt replied (a) that an empirical 
observation is not sufficient in itself to establish the authenticity of a 
succession, and (b) that at all events observed regularity does not bear upon 
things such as they are in themselves, but on the phe- nomenal result of an 
investigation guided from the outset by the regulatory principle of 
succession in accordance with a rule. Thus, the sole lesson carried by the 
experiment relating to the principle of causality is that it is not impossible 
to find conditions in which there is a satisfactory degree of mutual 
consistency between the transcendental presuppositions which subtend the 
investigation (of which one is the principle of causality), and the empirical 
product of this same investigation. It is not that the presuppositions in 
question in fact do have an empirical foundation. The case of decoherence 
is treated in exactly the same fashion. Here, all that is proven by the 
corroboration experiments of deco- herence, is that there exist experimental 
conditions in which a satisfactory degree of mutual consis- tency is shown 
between the principal presupposition of the investigation (being the 
availability of a classical environment of objects and properties within the 
laboratory space) and the empirical results obtained under the regime of 
that presupposition. It is not that the emergence of the presupposed classical 
structure on the macroscopic scale from out of a quantum structure 
necessarily possesses an authentic empirical foundation. 
In this way a harmony is assured between the absence of a probabilistic 
feature of an objectiv- ity constituted in space-time in quantum mechanics, 
and the presupposition of this level of objec- tivity by the very 
experimentation which aims to test it. A harmony which is internal and 
constitutive rather than external and ontological. 
Translated from the French by Colin Anderson  
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